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Abstract
We study Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) and quantity fixing arrangements
(QF) in a framework with successive monopolies under both adverse selection and
moral hazard. The analysis compares the private and the welfare properties of both
contractual modes. Under asymmetric information, both kinds of vertical contracts
entail a double marginalization driven by the information rents distributed to a
privately informed downstream retailer. This forces the upstream producer to sell
above his marginal costs. The upstream producer always prefers RPM to QF, but
the impact of RPM on consumers’ surplus is ambiguous. Whenever RPM is the
preferred contracting mode for the vertical structure from an ex ante viewpoint, it
also raises consumers’ surplus, thereby producing a Pareto improvement relative to
QF contracts.
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1 Introduction
Contracts between vertically related firms (manufacturer-retailer pairs) have been re-
cently at the heart of an intense debate in the IO literature. A number of theoretical
contributions1 have demonstrated that an appropriate design of vertical restraints allows
upstream manufacturers to influence the competitive behavior of their retailers. A central
issue for competition policy is then to study the welfare properties of those vertical ar-
rangements which are usually observed in real-world environments2 and which, potentially,
may restrain the retailers’ activities. In this respect, two important features of a vertical
relationship (manufacturer-retailer) might play a crucial role in order to clarify what are
the welfare properties of different kinds of vertical restraints. First, retailers are typically
better informed about local market conditions than manufacturers, so that an adverse
selection problem arises. Second, retailers carry out demand enhancing (non-market) ac-
tivities such as marketing and advertising policies which are typically not verifiable by
third parties; a moral hazard issue.
This paper examines both the private and the welfare properties of vertical contracts
based on retail price restrictions in a framework with successive monopolies. We consider
a setting where information asymmetries constrain the efficiency frontier of a contractual
relationship between an upstream manufacturer and a privately informed downstream
retailer. These risk-neutral monopolists interact in a standard principal-agent way un-
der both adverse selection and moral hazard. The upstream firm (principal) has full
bargaining power and hires a retailer (agent) before production occurs, but after uncer-
tainty about demand is realized. Two types of vertical contracts are compared. The
upstream manufacturer can either commit to a simple quantity fixing (QF) contract, or
to a more sophisticated arrangement, comparable to resale price maintenance (RPM). A
QF arrangement is more flexible than RPM in the sense that, beyond fixing the quantity
supplied to final consumers, it leaves the downstream firm free to choose its most pre-
ferred level of demand enhancing marketing activities (promotional expenditures and/or
production of indivisible services). Instead, a RPM mechanism, besides fixing the quan-
tity supplied in the final market, also restrains the retail price charged to final consumers
in order to indirectly control the non-market activities exerted by the retailer.
Asymmetric information plays a crucial role in our analysis. It introduces two sources
of inefficiency. First, because of the retailer’s superior information, the upstream firm has
to give up information rent to induce information revelation: a distributive effect. Second,
when both the input and the retail price influence these information rents, an allocative
1Blair and Lewis (1994), Gal-Or (1991), Martimort (1996), Mathewson and Winter (1984), Jullien
and Rey and (2000), Rey and Tirole (1986) and Winter (1993) among others.
2Exclusive territories, resale price maintenance, exclusive dealings etc. are forms of vertical contracts
typically banned by antitrust law.
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effect reduces productive efficiency.3 In this case, to improve productive efficiency and
minimize agency costs, optimality requires a downward distortion of the inefficient types’
allocations. Importantly, this effect generates a peculiar form of double marginalization
(or excessive retail pricing) which is at the heart of the net welfare loss that we shall
analyze in the sequel.
The objective of the analysis is twofold. We first study the private and welfare prop-
erties of both types of vertical restraints. The use of retail price restrictions may have an
ambiguous effect on consumers’ welfare, though it raises unambiguously manufacturer’s
profits relative to QF. Precisely, under asymmetric information, both types of vertical
restraints force the upstream manufacturer to sell above his marginal costs, thereby pro-
ducing double marginalization. This effect not only distorts (downward) productive effi-
ciency but also lowers consumers’ welfare. In this respect, we provide conditions under
which the welfare loss that double mark-ups inflict on consumers is minimized either by
RPM or QF. Our results show that RPM enhances consumers’ surplus relative to QF
whenever the retailer’s marginal utility of effort is convex. In light of these results, the
analysis reveals that the concerns about social desirability of RPM, typically addressed
by antitrust authorities, are justified only under certain technological conditions related
to the nature of services produced by retailers.
Second, we investigate conditions under which an antitrust authority should ban con-
tracts based on price restrictions. We show that, whenever a contracting mode maximizes
consumers’ surplus it also maximizes the joint-profit of the vertical structure. Assessing
the social desirability of a given vertical restraint amounts thus only to verify whether it
is also privately optimal from the vertical structure’s point of view.
The present paper contributes to a large theoretical and empirical literature on ver-
tical restraints, dating back to the seminal contributions by Spengler (1950) and Telser
(1960). This literature focuses on the private and welfare effects of vertical restraints and
is motivated by the extensive use of those practices in the real-world. Remarkably, the use
of retail price restrictions has been subject to radical changes in intellectual and political
attitudes over the last decades. The economic effects of these practices have been at the
heart of a controversial debate for a long time. As stressed by Neven et al. (1998), in
the early days of competition policy free-market transactions were treated as a necessary
condition for a market to achieve social efficiency. According to this simple view, any re-
striction to the business strategies of downstream firms was perceived as socially inefficient
and “presumably” anticompetitive. By contrast, the so-called Chicago School approach,
stemming from the pioneering contributions by Spengler (1950) and Telser (1960) and
3In our setting we shall say that contract A entails more productive efficiency relative to contract B if
the quantity supplied on the final market under A is closer to a given benchmark relative to the quantity
supplied under B.
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developed by the work of Mathewson and Winter (1984-1986), subsequently proposed an
argument in favor of vertical restraints. Intuitively, this body of literature pointed out
that vertical restraints in the form of retail price targets may instead beneficially help
upstream manufacturers to internalize transaction costs.4 The traditional (Chicago style)
argument in favor of RPM hinges on the simple idea that, when only linear prices are
allowed, it prevents the social loss due to double marginalization5 and, likewise, it allows
vertical organizations to improve productive efficiency. More recently, a number of con-
tributions, noticeably Tirole and Rey (1986) and Jullien and Rey (2000) among others,
have noted that, under some significant circumstances, the Chicago conjecture may fail
to the extent that: (i) under uncertainty and/or informational asymmetries price restric-
tions might generate monopoly power; and (ii) in several important cases they harm the
competitive process by softening competition either at the manufacturer or at the retail
level.6 Our main contribution consists in showing that those results may follow from a
simple successive monopolies model under asymmetric information.7
The substantial discrepancy between the Chicago school conjecture and the insights
of the more recent theoretical contributions has certainly disoriented competition policy
authorities. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has changed several times its view
about the lawfulness of RPM.8 The main source of this inconsistency seems to be a
case-by-case analysis of circumstances where vertical restraints are adopted. This is the
reason why many economists, as for instance Tirole (1988), recognize that a crucial step
in this matter would be the provision, at a theoretical level, of a careful classification
and operational criteria clarifying under what conditions certain vertical restraints are
likely to harm third-parties such as consumers. In this perspective, the second part of our
analysis strengthens the conjecture that vertical contracts based on retail price restrictions
should not be banned, provided that contractual modes maximizes the ex ante joint-profit
of the vertical structure. This suggests that, in some important circumstances, antitrust
4Such as vertical and horizontal externalities harmful to final consumers and downstream competitors.
5Under the hypothesis of complete information, double mark-ups exist only if firms are forced to
employ linear pricing. In this setting the upstream firm will charge a wholesale price above its marginal
cost which, in turn, implies excessive retail pricing.
6In particular, Jullien and Rey (2000) emphasize that the use of RPM enhances market power because
eliminating retail price flexibility facilitates collusive behavior in imperfect competitive industries. In the
same vein, Whinston (1990) shows that certain forms of vertical restraints may harm consumers and
produce anticompetitive effects in the presence of dynamic externalities.
7Kastl and Piccolo (2004) extends a version of this model without moral hazard to a imperfect com-
petitive environment where two vertical hierarchies produce differentiated goods.
8Already in the 1911 the Supreme Court declared this practice to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act as a form of horizontal price fixing among downstream competitors (Dr. Miles Medical Case). This
position changed just eight years later (1919) when the same Court softened its previous conclusions.
In 1968 the court still pronounced against RPM when a newspaper attempted to impose maximum
resale price on its distributors. Finally in 1997, the court revised its previous positions by declaring that
maximum RPM should be judged under the rule of reason even if minimum RPM was still declared illegal
per se. See Comanor (1985) for an extensive discussion on this issue.
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law should treat retail price maintenance as a welfare-improving instrument. This is in
contrast with the past antitrust authorities’ tendency to sentence retail price restrictions
and protect simple arrangements such as quantity discounts contracts.9
Related Literature. Before proceeding, let us briefly relate our analysis to the literature
on vertical contracting. Other previous contributions have analyzed the welfare effects of
retail price restrictions in a way close to ours. Gal-Or (1991) compares vertical contracts
based on quantity fixing and price restrictions in a context of successive monopolies where
adverse selection can either be unidimensional or two-dimensional according to the type
of instruments used by the upstream manufacturer in order to extract the downstream
retailer information. In this pure adverse selection context, she points out that the use
of price restrictions reduces the “dimensionality” of the adverse selection problem and, in
contrast to our results, besides mimicking vertical integration, it always improves upon
productive efficiency. This result implies, in turn, that RPM increases unambiguously
consumers welfare through alleviating double marginalization. Introducing a moral hazard
component, we will show that this result must be qualified and depends on fine details of
the retailers’ technology for providing services.
Blair and Lewis (1994) consider also a vertical contracting problem with both adverse
selection and moral hazard for a general demand specification. Differently from us, how-
ever, they focus on RPM contracts, and show that optimal contracts exhibit some form
of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing. They do not compare those contracts
with QF arrangements and thus cannot draw any implications for antitrust policy as we
do below.
Our contribution extends the results of Gal-Or and Blair-Lewis in two respects. On
the one hand, as Gal-Or, we compare the welfare and private effects of different vertical
restraints, namely QF and RPM contracts, but we introduce the moral hazard compo-
nent driving our welfare results. As we will show, adding this moral hazard component
is key to our result. Not only it is certainly more relevant from a real world perspective,
but it also allows us to explore more carefully the relationship between the kinds of con-
tractual instruments used by upstream producers, retailer’s information rents and double
marginalization.10 On the other hand, while Blair and Lewis are mainly interested in
comparing RPM to a contract maximizing joint-profits, we are more concerned with the
differences between RPM and QF. In doing so we shed light on two important aspects of
the problem at hand. First, on a positive ground, we provide a careful, formal charac-
9Over the last decades the antitrust authorities in the Unites States has argued unambiguously against
the use of resale price maintenance. Refiners, for instance, have been a favorite target of antitrust
arrangements. Courts decisions have pronounced as unlawful contractual schemes through which the
retail price was controlled by the upstream refiners.
10Without moral hazard, our model, as in Gal-or (1991), would yield the extreme result that RPM
suffices to nullify the scope for retailers to get information rents from their private information on demand.
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terization of the private and welfare properties of both contractual regimes. Second, our
analysis also provides some criteria that could be used by antitrust authorities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 briefly studies
the complete information benchmark and confirms the well-known equivalence between
contracting modes in such contexts. Section 4 characterizes the optimal allocations under
both kinds of mechanisms in a context of asymmetric information and compares the main
features of those contracts. Section 5 analyzes the welfare properties of both contracting
modes. Section 6 provides some extensions. Section 7 briefly summarizes our findings.
Most of the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
Setting. Consider an upstream manufacturer who sells an essential input to a privately
informed retailer. Assume that this downstream firm, a monopolist as well, converts
this intermediate input with a one-to-one technology11 and supplies the final product on
a retail market. Let P (q, θ˜, e) = θ˜ + e − q denote the inverse market demand.12 This
simple specification captures two traditional features of manufacturer-retailer relation-
ships. First, consumers must be informed about the existence and the characteristics of
a product before buying it; hence e denotes a nonverifiable demand-increasing effort13
exerted by the retailer. Alternatively, the retailer may exert after-sales services which
are to a large extent non-contractible. Providing effort is costly, and we denote by ψ (e)
an increasing, strictly convex and three times differentiable disutility function. Second,
retailers have more information about final demand than manufacturers. Accordingly, we
model θ˜ as an exogenously given random variable measuring the consumers’ willingness
to pay14, distributed on the compact support Θ ≡ [θ, θ¯] with a cumulative distribution
function F (θ) and a positive density f (θ) . We will sometimes refer to θ as the retailer’s
type.
Assumptions. Let h(θ) = (1 − F (θ))/f(θ) define the inverse hazard rate associated to
F (θ).
11This is a simplifying assumption used extensively in the IO literature.
12Up to a simple renormalization, our model can be generalized to allow inverse demand functions of
the form P (q, θ˜, e) = θ + e− φ(q) for some φ(·) increasing and convex.
13This variable can be thought of as a nonverifiable non-market activity carried out by the downstream
firm such as expenditures on advertising and/or production of demand-increasing indivisible services.
By nonverifiable here we mean that the effort level is not verifiable by a third-party, such as a Court,
enforcing contracts.
14This variable might represent local market conditions which are observed only by the closest firm to
final consumers.
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A1. (i) The cumulative distribution function F (θ) is differentiable; (ii) f (θ) > 0
and h˙ (θ) = ∂h(θ)/∂θ ≤ 0 for all θ with θ ≥ 1/f(θ).
These assumptions are standard in the agency literature under adverse selection. In
particular, (i) is not necessary but is assumed for convenience15; whereas (ii) ensures full
separation of types at the optimum.
A2. (i) ψ (0) = 0 and ψ′(e) ≥ 0 for all e ≥ 0; (ii) Inada conditions: ψ′(0) = 0 and
ψ′(e) = +∞ as e→ +∞; (iii) ψ′′(e) > 1/2 for all e ≥ 0.
These are technical requirements needed in order to deal with well-defined (concave)
optimization programs having interior solutions.
A3. Both the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer produce at zero
(marginal) costs.16
Contracts. As in the previous literature (Blair and Lewis (1994) and Gal-Or (1991)), we
invoke the Revelation Principle17 to describe the set of incentive feasible allocations. Pre-
cisely, the model considers the standard framework where a communication stage between
the upstream manufacturer (principal) and the downstream firm (agent) is played before
production occurs. At this stage the informed agent delivers to the uninformed principal
a message, θˆ, about the realized state of demand. Given this message, the manufacturer
proposes a contract specifying, for all θˆ, both a quantity, a franchise fee and, possibly,
a retail price restriction in the form of a price target. Let M ≡ {QF,RPM} define the
space of deterministic and piecewise differentiable18 direct revelation mechanisms. The up-
stream manufacturer can either commit to a restricted mechanism, QF ≡
{
q(θˆ), t(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
,
where q(θˆ) and t(θˆ) define a quantity and a franchise fee schedules, respectively. Or, al-
ternatively, she might propose an unrestricted mechanism, RPM ≡
{
p(θˆ), q(θˆ), t(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
,
which specifies also a retail price target besides a quantity and a franchise fee. With a lit-
tle abuse of language we shall label the former mechanism as a “quantity fixing” contract,
whereas the latter one will be referred to as “resale price maintenance”. Under this latter
contractual regime, the retail price is (costlessly) verifiable by the manufacturer and by a
Court enforcing contracts.19
15See Fudenberg and Tirole (1998, pp. 257) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, pp. 64).
16This is just a normalization.
17See Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 2) among others.
18In order to make use of standard optimization techniques, we shall only consider the class of piecewise
differentiable direct revelation mechanisms.
19In a related environment Maskin and Riley (1985) and Khalil and Laware´e (1995) examine the choice
of output versus input monitoring instrument in a principal-agent relationship.
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Noteworthy, a QF arrangement is equivalent to a vertically decentralized organizational
structure, or, in a more general sense, to an incomplete contract. Under this contractual
scheme, the upstream manufacturer does not have enough instruments to monitor the
promotional effort level exerted by the retailer. Instead, RPM will be seen to replicate
the constrained vertical integration20 outcome, since, by dictating the retail price and the
quantity sold to the retailer, the upstream manufacturer is able to control directly21 the
retailer’s effort level. In this respect, one can think of RPM as being a complete contract.
Timing. Once a contracting mode, either Q or RPM is chosen, the game unfolds as
follows:
- At time t=1. θ˜ realizes and only the retailer observes it.
- At time t=2. The upstream monopolist makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
retailer according to the chosen contracting mode.
-At time t=3. The retailer accepts or refuses this offer. If he accepts, he exerts effort
e, production occurs and, finally, payments are made according to the contract selected
at time t=1. If he rejects, both firms get their outside options which are normalized to
zero for simplicity.22
3 The Complete Information Benchmark
When the demand parameter θ˜ is common knowledge and the upstream manufacturer
can enforce a (type-dependent) franchise fee, the efficient vertical integration outcome is
achieved under both contractual regimes. In both cases, there is full extraction of the
retailer’s surplus and no double marginalization.
Resale Price Maintenance. Let t(θ) define the franchise fee paid by the retailer to the
manufacturer in order to obtain q(θ) units of intermediate input. For any given admissible
θ, the upstream manufacturer must design an allocation
{
qR(θ), pR(θ), tR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ which
maximizes the franchise fee he gets subject to e = p + q − θ for all (p, q, θ), and the
following retailer’s participation constraint:
(PC) u(θ) = p(θ)q(θ)− ψ (p(θ) + q(θ)− θ)− t(θ) ≥ 0.
20See Tirole (1988, Chapter 4) for a more detailed discussion.
21Indeed, for any given pair {p(θ), q(θ)}θ∈Θ chosen by the upstream producer, the optimal effort sched-
ule is directly fixed through the inverse demand function, i.e., e(θ) = p(θ) + q(θ)− θ for all θ.
22Acconcia, Martina and Piccolo (2005) analyze the welfare effects of RPM in the case of type-dependent
outside options.
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Given Assumption A2, the first-order conditions with respect to p and q are necessary
and sufficient for optimality:
pR (θ) = qR(θ) = ψ′(eR (θ)). (1)
At the optimum, marginal revenues are equal to marginal costs. Since by increasing
both the retail price and the quantity, the effort must raise too in order to satisfy the
identity eR(θ) = 2qR(θ)−θ for all θ, the above first-order conditions are readily interpreted.
Quantity Fixing. The retail price is no longer controlled by the manufacturer and the
effort maximizes the retailer’s profit. For any given θ, the manufacturer’s maximizes the
franchise fee subject to a standard participation constraint (PC) which must now take
into account that the retailer will chose effort optimally.
Formally, for any given admissible θ, the upstream manufacturer must design an allo-
cation
{
qQ(θ), tQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ to maximize t(θ) subject to:
(PC) u(θ) = −t(θ) + max
e∈<+
{(θ + e− q(θ)) q(θ)− ψ (e)} ≥ 0.
Note that the participation constraint (PC) must now take into account that the retailer
chooses an effort e(θ) such that ψ′(e(θ)) = q(θ).
Let φ(.) denote the inverse of ψ′(.). The optimal quantity qQ(θ) is defined by the
following necessary and sufficient first-order condition:23
θ + φ
(
qQ(θ)
)− 2qQ(θ) = 0. (2)
Indeed, as both productive technologies (resp. upstream and downstream) operate
without costs, this latter condition just says that optimality requires to equalize marginal
revenues to zero.
Welfare Analysis. The next proposition whose proof is straightforward shows that,
under complete information and when a franchise fee is enforceable, RPM and QF yield
exactly the same outcome.
Proposition 1 Efforts, outputs and fixed-fees are the same under RPM and QF: (i) qR (θ) =
qQ (θ) = q∗ (θ); (ii) eR (θ) = eQ (θ) = e∗(θ); and (iii) tR(θ) = tQ(θ), for all θ.
Even though the retailer’s effort is nonverifiable, a franchise fee suffices to achieve the
efficient vertical integration outcome under complete information whatever the contractual
23Again Assumption A2 ensures concavity of the manufacturer’s objective function.
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mode chosen. In both cases, the downstream firm earns zero rents and there is no double
marginalization. This result is due to the absence of any vertical externality between the
manufacturer and the retailer; both agree on how to set the retailer’s effort to increase
demand.
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 1, consumers’ welfare and manufacturer’s
profits do not change across contractual modes. Therefore, RPM and QF both achieve
exactly the first-best level of profit for the vertically integrated structure.24In the next
section, however, we prove that under asymmetric information conclusions change dras-
tically because the non-verifiability of effort introduces under adverse selection a vertical
externality between the manufacturer and the retailer who no longer agree on the level of
this effort.
4 Asymmetric Information
Under both adverse selection and moral hazard, the downstream retailer extracts some
information rent. This rent of course depends on whether QF or RPM is the chosen
contractual mode.
More specifically, the possibility for the retailer to claim that large sales are due to a
high effort level, whereas they result instead from a high demand, induces the upstream
manufacturer to give up some information rent to the high demand retailer (high θ) in
order to induce truthtelling. As a result, the second-best allocation is characterized by a
downward distortion of both quantity and effort supplied by the retailer when he faces a
low demand. This effect, in turn, forces the upstream manufacturer to produce above its
marginal costs, which generates a double marginalization.
In what follows, we characterize the optimal allocation (p(θ), e(θ), q(θ)) for each real-
ization of θ under both RPM and QF. Then, we examine the properties of these allocations
and show that: (i) effort is always larger under QF than under RPM; (ii) the impact on
quantity is ambiguous.
Resale Price Maintenance. The upstream manufacturer observes and can contract
also the retail market price besides the quantity supplied by the downstream firm to final
consumers.
The effort level is then indirectly fixed as a function of θ through the inverse demand,
i.e., e = p + q − θ for all (p, q, θ). RPM is less flexible than QF. Indeed, whenever the
retailer faces a retail price and an input targets, she is indirectly forced to choose the
24This is of course a standard result in the IO literature (see Tirole (1988, Chapter 4)).
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effort level.25 In this respect, one can thus think of RPM as being a complete contract
since the upstream manufacturer uses all available instruments to control the retailer’s
activity.
Under asymmetric information, the manufacturer’s problem is to design a menu of
contracts to maximize the expected franchise fee he receives subject to the retailer’s par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints, together with the additional restriction
required by the retail price targets. Given that e(θ) = p(θ)+q(θ)−θ for all (p(θ), q(θ), θ),
the optimal allocation must solve the following maximization program:26
PR

max
〈p(.),q(.),t(.)〉
θ∫
θ
t (θ) dF (θ)
s.t.
(IC1) u˙ (θ) = ψ
′ (p(θ) + q(θ)− θ)
(IC2) q˙ (θ) + p˙ (θ) ≥ 0
(PC) u(θ) = p(θ)q(θ)− ψ (p(θ) + q(θ)− θ)− t(θ) ≥ 0.
(IC1) and (IC2) are respectively the first-order and second-order local conditions for
incentive compatibility constraints.27 The participation constraint (PC) is defined as in
the previous section.
Integrating (IC1) yields the following expression for the information rent of a type-θ
retailer:
u(θ) = u(θ) +
θ∫
θ
ψ′(e (s))ds. (3)
High-type retailers have an incentive to mimic low-type ones. Indeed, by misrepresent-
ing this way, retailers earn some information rent since demand is higher than reported,
and the effort can be reduced so as to still meet the retail price and quantity targets. This
is the intuitive reason why information rents must increase with the effort level.
Before proceeding, let us state a condition which will turn to be useful in what follows.
A4. ψ′′ (e) + ψ′′′(e)h(θ) ≥ 1/2 for all (e, θ) ∈ R+ × [θ, θ¯].
This is a technical assumption which ensures that the next auxiliary program remains
25In a more general sense one can notice that the direct revelation mechanism {p(θ), q(θ), t(θ)}θ∈Θ
resembles the cost reimbursement contract studied in the context of regulation by Laffont and Tirole
(1986). In their framework, costs observability plays the same role as price restrictions in ours.
26The proof is standard and is thus omitted.
27As standard in this literature we prove in the Appendix that those constraints replace the global
incentive compatibility constraint.
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always concave and displays a unique maximum28 even if the third derivative of the
function ψ(e) might be negative. By using a standard optimization technique, we first
solve a properly defined auxiliary program that neglects constraint (IC2). Then we prove
in the Appendix that its solution also solves PR since it satisfies both the monotonicity
condition (IC2) and the global incentive compatibility constraint. By using equation (3)
together with constraint (PC), and integrating by parts, one obtains the next auxiliary
maximization program:
max
〈q(.),p(.)〉
∫ θ
θ
{p(θ)q(θ)− ψ (p(θ) + q(θ)− θ)− h(θ)ψ′(p(θ) + q(θ)− θ)} dF (θ) . (4)
Let
{
pR(θ), qR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ define the solution to (4). Pointwise optimization yields the fol-
lowing necessary and sufficient conditions:
pR(θ)− ψ′ (eR(θ))− h(θ)ψ′′ (eR(θ)) = 0, (5)
qR(θ)− ψ′ (eR(θ))− h(θ)ψ′′ (eR(θ)) = 0. (6)
Conditions (5) and (6) together imply that pR(θ) = qR(θ) for all θ and thus
θ + eR(θ)− 2qR(θ) = 0. (7)
Although the manufacturer has full control of both retail price and sales, she is not able
to achieve the first-best because of asymmetric information. Intuitively, when choosing
both the optimal retail price and the sales level, the upstream firm must trade-off the
(positive) effect on revenues with the (negative) impact of these variables on the retailer’s
information rent. Since (7) holds, one can notice that whenever p and q rise, e must
increase too. Since mimicking is more profitable for the retailer whenever a (sufficiently)
high promotional effort level is required, it follows that both the optimal price target
and the sales level must entail a downward distortion with respect to the first-best under
asymmetric information. Formally, one can easily prove that, under assumptions A1-A4,
the allocation
{
eR(θ), qR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ exhibits downward distortion of both effort and sales,
i.e., eR (θ) ≤ e∗ (θ) and qR (θ) ≤ q∗ (θ) for all θ with equality only at θ.
Importantly, it should be noticed that: (i) for any given effort level, equation (7)
shows that output is set at its monopoly level; and (ii) equation (6) shows that effort is
downward distorted to reduce information rent. This is reminiscent of the “dichotomy”
28A simple example is provided by the case where ψ (e) = (e2/4) + α
∫ e
0
log (x+ 1) dx with α ≥ 0 and
F (θ) = (θ− θ)/(θ¯− θ) with θ¯− θ ≤ 1. Moreover the additional restriction θ > 1+2α also implies interior
solutions.
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result in Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 3). Quantities are not used for rent extraction
purposes: the “monopoly condition” p(θ) = q(θ) for all θ already found under complete
information still prevails. Of course, because effort is downward distorted the quantity
itself falls below its first-best level but this effect is indirect only.
In accordance with the Chicago School, our results highlight that RPM allows the
upstream manufacturer to force the retailer to supply the constrained-efficient vertical
integration effort level. In this sense, one may conclude that, in our vertical contracting
environment, retail price restrictions may help to enforce a stricter monitoring regime for
those (nonverifiable) non-market activities supplied by retailers.
Implementation of RPM. We conclude the analysis of RPM by proving that the opti-
mal direct revelation mechanism characterized above can easily be implemented with two
simple instruments: (i) a menu of linear contracts, and (ii) a retail price target. Instead
of using the truthful direct revelation mechanism
{
qR(θ), pR(θ), tR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ, the upstream
manufacturer might as well give up any direct communication with the downstream re-
tailer and let him choose the input level within a menu of linear contracts cum RPM,
namely {T (q, q0), p = q}
Corollary 2 There exists a menu of linear contracts cum RPM {T (q, q0), p = q} where
T (q, q0) = T
R(q0) + (T
R)′(q0)(q − q0) that implements the same allocation as the optimal
direct revelation mechanism
{
pR(θ), qR(θ), tR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ.
This indirect mechanism exhibits both retail price restrictions and productivity re-
wards, which are commonly observed in several forms of vertical integration. Formally,
the possibility of implementing the optimum with a linear contract cum RPM is simply
due to the convexity of the monetary transfer paid by the manufacturer to the downstream
firm. When this property holds, one can replace the nonlinear contract TR(q) = tR(θR(q)))
(if p = q and +∞ otherwise) obtained from tR(θ) and qR(θ)29 by the menu of its linear
tangents. Accordingly the retailer chooses within this menu his most preferred linear
contract, T (·, q0), and then the level of input purchased q. Under RPM, the retail price is
fixed to that output level to maintain the monopoly optimality conditions even though,
under adverse selection, the retailer ’s effort is no longer first-best.30
Quantity Fixing. The upstream manufacturer commits now not to observe the ex-
post realization of the retail price, but she still can observe and contract on the market
29Using nonlinear instruments instead of direct revelation mechanism is sometimes referred to as using
the Taxation Principle. See Laffont and Martimort (2002, pp. 375-379) and Rogerson (1998) for a more
detailed discussion.
30One can easily check that in this set-up the same result can be obtained also with a price floor, i.e.,
p ≥ q, or with a price ceiling, i.e., p ≤ q.
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quantity supplied by the downstream firm on the retail market.31 A QF mechanism can
thus be viewed as an incomplete contract relative to RPM since the upstream producer
gives up a screening instrument.
The manufacturer’s problem is to design a menu of contracts {q(θ), t(θ)}θ∈Θ to maxi-
mize the expected franchise fee subject to participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints for all θ. By using standard techniques the maximization program may be written
as:32
PQ

max
〈q(.),t(.)〉
∫ θ
θ
t (θ) dF (θ)
s.t.
(IC1) u˙(θ) = q(θ)
(IC2) q˙(θ) ≥ 0
(PC) u(θ) = −t(θ) + max
e∈<+
{(θ + e− q(θ)) q(θ)− ψ (e)} ≥ 0.
Importantly, the level of sales is now the only screening device available to the man-
ufacturer. For any given quantity schedule specified by the direct revelation mechanism
QF, the downstream retailer gains flexibility under a quantity-fixing arrangement in the
sense that the effort level is chosen to command more information rents than it would
be efficient from the manufacturer’s viewpoint. This form of contractual incompleteness,
in fact, provides the retailer with some monopoly power. More specifically, while choos-
ing the optimal effort level, the retailer does not internalize the impact of his effort on
the information rent given up by the upstream manufacturer. QF introduces a kind of
vertical externality between the manufacturer and his retailer which was absent under
complete information. As rents and effort are positively related via quantity, it will be
thus profitable to oversupply effort relative to RPM everything else being kept equal.
Integrating (IC1), one gets the following expression of the information rent of a type-θ
retailer:
u(θ) = u(θ) +
θ∫
θ
q(s)ds. (8)
Since effort is set so that to maximize the retailer’s profit, i.e., q(θ) = ψ′(e(θ)), it is
immediate to see that a higher effort increases also this information rent.
Below we first solve an auxiliary maximization program which neglects constraint
(IC2). Then, we prove in the Appendix that its solution optimizes also program PQ as
it satisfies both the monotonicity condition (IC2) and the global incentive compatibility
31This is a simplifying assumption ruling out the possibility of input storing. In our model, all the
units of input supplied by the upstream producer to the downstream retailer are sold on the final market.
See Section 6 below which shows the robustness of our result.
32Again, the proof is standard and is omitted.
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constraint. By using (8) together with the participation constraint (PC), and integrating
by parts, one obtains thus the next auxiliary program:
max
〈q(.)〉
θ∫
θ
{(θ + φ (q(θ))− q(θ)) q(θ)− h(θ)q(θ)− ψ (φ (q(θ)))} dF (θ) . (9)
Pointwise optimization of the integrand in (9) yields the necessary and sufficient first-
order condition for the optimal output qQ(θ):33
θ + φ
(
qQ(θ)
)− 2qQ(θ)− h(θ) = 0. (10)
Equation (10) shows that the upstream manufacturer chooses the optimal quantity so
as to equalize her virtual marginal revenues to zero. However, under asymmetric informa-
tion and QF, the demand parameter θ has now to be replaced by a lower virtual demand
parameter θ − h(θ). By doing so, output is reduced below the first-best. The allocation
of a low-demand type becomes less attractive to a high-demand one and the latter’s in-
centives to hide his type are mitigated. Reducing the output of an agent with type θ∗
reduces the information rents left to higher types θ ≥ θ∗. This explains intuitively why
larger hazard rates lead to lower virtual demand and to a stronger double marginalization
effect.
Under Assumption A2, equation (10) implies that the optimal allocation exhibits
downward distortions on both quantity and effort, i.e., qQ (θ) ≤ q∗ (θ) and eQ(θ) ≤ e∗(θ)
for all θ with equality only at θ. To minimize the information rents granted to high types,
the upstream manufacturer must give up productive efficiency by distorting downward
the input supplied to low types.
Implementation of QF. The optimal direct revelation mechanism characterized above
can be implemented by a simple menu of linear contracts. Instead of using the truthful
direct revelation mechanism
{
qQ(θ), tQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ, the upstream manufacturer might let the
downstream retailer choose the input level within a menu of linear contracts which are
tangent to a properly defined non-linear schedule TQ(q) = tQ(θQ(q)) obtained from tQ(θ)
and qQ(θ). The next corollary proves formally the result.
Corollary 3 There exists a menu of linear contracts of the form T (q, q0) = T
Q(q0) +
(TQ)′(q0)(q − q0) that implements the same allocation as the optimal direct revelation
mechanism
{
tQ(θ), qQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ.
33It is immediately to see that whenever Assumption A2 is satisfied the first-order condition (10) is
also sufficient for a global optimum.
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The menu of linear contracts T (q, q0) has three main features. First, it entails a
franchise fee; second it involves a linear (price) component; and, finally it also exhibits
some form of quantity discounts34 which are commonly observed in some manufacturers-
retailers relationships. As under RPM, this last property is again simply due to the
concavity of the non-linear schedule TQ(q), so that the (average) “price” paid to obtain q
units of intermediate input is decreasing with respect to the amount bought. Then, one
can replace the nonlinear contract TQ(q) by the menu of its linear tangents.
RPM versus QF. Let us now compare the allocations obtained under RPM and QF.
While the results obtained for effort schedules seem to confirm the findings of previous
contributions, strikingly, the conclusions achieved for the optimal quantity schedules may
not.
For the ease of the presentation, let consider first a cutting-edge case where the
marginal disutlity of effort is linear, i.e., ψ(e) = e2/2. Both types of contracts entail
then the same output, qQ(θ) = qR(θ) = θ − h(θ) for all θ. However, under QF, the agent
exerts more effort relative to RPM, eQ(θ) ≥ eR(θ) for all θ with equality only at θ.
More generally, two effects are at play simultaneously once one moves from the com-
plete (RPM) to the incomplete contracting environment (QF):
• First, for a given quantity, the agent exerts more effort under QF relative to RPM.
Under QF, the agent is residual claimant for the full impact of his effort on enhancing
demand. This effect raises effort and thus production: a “demand-enhancing effect”.
• Second, given that sales is the only screening instrument under QF, one needs to
distort it downward for rent extraction reasons: a “rent extraction effect”. The dichotomy
result between production and incentives no longer holds.
To better understand these two effects, it is useful to represent graphically on Figure
1 below outputs and efforts under both QF and RPM.
34This is akin to the quantity discount result due to Maskin and Riley (1984).
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Figure 1
On Figure 1, we observe that the RPM allocation is obtained at the intersection of:
q = ψ′(e) + h(θ)ψ′′(e) (11)
and
q =
θ + e
2
. (12)
The QF allocation is instead obtained at the intersection of:
q = ψ′(e) (13)
and
q =
θ − h(θ) + e
2
. (14)
The fact that (13) lies below (11) captures the demand-enhancing effect which pushes
effort and output up. That (14) lies below (12) represents the rent-extraction effect. It
reduces production. These two effects exactly compensate each other in the case of a
quadratic disutility function, ψ′′′(.) = 0. The proposition below states formally the result
in a more general setting.
Proposition 4 Assume that A1-A4 hold altogether, the allocations
{
eQ(θ), qQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ
and
{
eR(θ), qR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ satisfy the following properties: (i) e
Q (θ) ≥ eR (θ) for all θ (with
equality only at θ¯); and (ii) qR (θ) ≥ qQ (θ) (resp. ≤ 0) for all θ (with equality only at θ¯)
if ψ′′′(e) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0) for all e ≥ 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 has a simple economic interpretation. When a QF contract
is enforced, the upstream manufacturer gives up the control of the retailer’s effort. This
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decentralized organizational mode, crucially, allows the downstream firm to secure more
information rents by playing on his effort choice. More specifically, as effort affects pos-
itively quantity,35 the retailer profitably supplies more effort (relative to RPM) in order
to enjoy more rents.
Part (ii) reveals an important point. As we have pointed out before, by dictating both
the retail price and the sales level, the upstream firm mitigates the retailer’s incentives
to misrepresent his type. Although under RPM the retailer’s incentives to increase his
information rent by exerting a higher effort level are reduced, asymmetric information
still limits the possibility of achieving the first-best. Hence, a downward distortion of
the optimal allocation is still needed.36 In this respect, the above proposition provides
conditions under which RPM enhances (resp. weakens) productive efficiency with respect
to QF.
The trade-off between the enhancing-demand effect and the rent extraction effect cru-
cially depends on the third derivative of the effort disutility ψ(e). Whenever ψ′′′(.) > 0
(resp. < 0) the latter effect dominates (resp. is dominated by) the former one. To un-
derstand the respective magnitude of these effects, it is useful to rewrite the derivative
of the information rents under both QF and RPM if the same output schedule q(θ) were
implemented. With obvious notations, we would have:
u˙Q(θ) = q(θ) and u˙R(θ) = −ψ′(e(θ)) = q(θ)− h(θ)ψ′′(2q(θ)− θ)
where the last equality follows by using (11) and (12). These equations immediately
highlight that a greater output distortion is needed to reduce the agent’s rent under RPM
than under QF whenever ψ′′′(.) < 0.
5 Welfare Analysis
In light of the previous results, it becomes natural to examine how the two kinds of
contractual modes affect both consumers’ welfare and profits. As standard in the Antitrust
literature, our main welfare measure will be consumers’ surplus.37
Before proceeding, recall that both types of contracts entail a double marginalization
because of the additional costs due to the information rent of the downstream retailer.
It follows that, in order to evaluate whether retail price restrictions are detrimental to
35Remember that under QF the downstream dealer chooses his effort according to the rule q = ψ′(e).
36This distinguishes our analysis from Gal-Or (1991) where RPM is a sufficient instrument to nullifies
information rents when the only piece of private information held by the retailer is on demand.
37Much scholars have indeed advocated that the sole role of Antitrust policies should be to promote
consumers’ surplus. See Bork (1978, Chapter 2, pp. 51) for instance.
18
consumers’ welfare, one needs to examine which contractual mode entails the largest
double mark-up effect, i.e., the largest quantity distortion.
Let Eθ[∆CS (θ)] ≡ Eθ[CSR (θ)] − Eθ[CSQ (θ)] define the difference between the ex-
pected consumers’ surplus under RPM and QF, respectively.
Proposition 5 Assume A1-A4, the following properties hold: (i) Eθ[∆CS (θ)] ≥ 0 (resp.
≤ 0) if ψ′′′(·) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0); and (ii) the upstream manufacturer always prefers RPM
to QF.
As in Gal-Or (1991), RPM increases consumers’ welfare only when it improves upon
productive efficiency with respect to QF. By introducing moral hazard, our analysis em-
phasizes also that this result no longer holds when ψ′′′(·) < 0. In this case, the adoption
of retail price restrictions, aimed at solving the agency problem, induces a (social) cost in
terms of productive efficiency which is too large with respect to QF.38
Finally, part (ii) has a natural economic interpretation. Since the set of (screening)
instruments available to the upstream manufacturer under RPM is larger than that offered
by QF, the upstream manufacturer must prefer RPM to QF.
Only when the marginal disutility of the retailer’s effort is convex, it is the case that
RPM, which is the most preferred contracting mode for the manufacturer from an ex ante
viewpoint, also improves consumers’ surplus. From an operational viewpoint, Antitrust
authorities may thus find it a priori quite difficult to conclude on the impact of RPM
without having some specific knowledge of the retailers’ cost of services.
This mixed conclusion may not be of much practical value for Antitrust authorities.
Fine details on the shape of the disutility function may be hard to ascertain a priori.
Alternatively, we will see below that a more operational criterion is available if the industry
chooses the contractual mode to maximize ex ante joint-profit.
From an ex ante viewpoint, the contractual mode which maximizes the joint-profit of
the vertical structure solves:
max
ω∈M
Eθ [R (e
ω (θ) , qω (θ) , θ)− ψ (eω (θ))] ,
where R (eω (θ) , qω (θ) , θ) ≡ (θ + eω(θ)− qω(θ))qω(θ) defines the revenue function for all
θ and ω ∈M. Let us define by Eθ[∆Π (θ)] the difference between the joint profits of the
vertical structure under RPM and QF respectively.
The next proposition highlights the crucial role played by the relative magnitude of the
distortion in productive and allocative39 efficiency involved by QF and RPM, respectively.
38See also Comanor (1985).
39We refer to productive efficiency to measure the distance between the complete information sales
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Proposition 6 The joint-profit of the vertical structure is greater (resp. lower) with
RPM than with QF if ψ′′′(·) > 0 (resp. ≤ 0).
This proposition has a clear economic interpretation. The vertical structure would
like to commit ex ante to the contract minimizing distortion with respect to the complete
information benchmark.
Two cases may occur depending on the sign of ψ′′′(·):
• Case 1: qR (θ) ≤ qQ (θ) and eQ(θ) ≥ eR(θ), for all θ. Then, QF is preferred to RPM
by the vertical structure. Intuitively, by refusing to enforce retail price restrictions,
the manufacturer/retailer coalition benefits from two effects: first an improvement
in productive efficiency, i.e., qQ (θ) ≥ qR (θ) for all θ; second an increase in the
consumers’ willingness to pay for the final product, i.e., the enhancing-demand
effect eQ(θ) ≥ eR(θ) for all θ.
• Case 2: qR (θ) ≥ qQ (θ) and eQ(θ) ≥ eR(θ), for all θ. The coalition must now trade off
the rent-extraction effect (productive efficiency) with the enhancing-demand effect
(allocative efficiency). However, we show in the Appendix that the productive
efficiency gain involved by RPM always overcomes the effect of surplus extraction
due to the possibility of facing consumers with a higher willingness to pay produced
under QF.
In practice, variations in the sign of ψ′′′(·) may capture several natural scenarios.
For instance, the case where ψ′′′(·) < 0, which implies that the marginal costs of effort
are increasing and concave, seems to fit the idea that there are some learning-by-doing
economies in the production of effort. Meaning that the larger is the exerted effort level
the lower are its associated marginal costs. This could well happen when retailers produce
indivisible services whose production benefits from specific (marketing) skills which can
be acquired only over the time.40 On the other hand, the case where ψ′′′(·) > 0 captures
the situation where marginal costs of effort are increasing and convex. This scenario seems
to fit well “pure advertising”, where the marginal costs of a brand entering a new market
are convex because of localization and transportation costs.
The previous result has an immediate but important corollary which reveals a policy
implication supporting, to some extent, the Chicago-school conjecture.
level and those obtained under either QF or RPM. Instead, we refer to allocative efficiency to measure
the difference between the complete information effort level and those obtained either under RPM or QF.
40Of course, this would certainly require modelling the relationship between the manufacturer and
his retailer in a dynamic setting. However, one could view our static model as a convenient short cut
capturing this effect when ψ′′′ is negative.
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Corollary 7 Whenever RPM is ex ante optimal from the vertical structure’s viewpoint,
it also raises consumers’ surplus and total welfare relative to QF.
Since consumers prefer RPM when it increases productive efficiency relative to QF, and
the vertical structure commits to RPM only if it raises sufficiently productive efficiency
with respect to QF, it can be easily concluded that the use of price restrictions always
generates a Pareto improvement relative to QF.
In some sense, this result extends the traditional Chicago view to a more sophisticated
environment where firms use more complex strategies than linear prices.41 The main
policy message of the section reveals that, whenever vertical structures choose contractual
modes according to an ex ante criterion of joint-profit maximization, the choice of price
restrictions must be regarded as optimal. Remarkably, it follows that, by banning the
practice of vertical price fixing, an antitrust authority might harm consumers and decrease
total welfare in some cases.
Given this result, the true underlying issue is whether ex ante joint-profit maximization
for the choice of contractual mode is plausible both from a theoretical and a practical
viewpoints.
One may actually think of several justification for joint-profit maximization as the
relevant criterion to judge organizational choices. Indeed, there is no reason to think
that the same allocation of bargaining powers between the manufacturer and the retailer
prevails ex ante and ex post.42 Ex post, once the retailer knows his private information
on demand, the investment in promotional effort may be quite specific and not easily
redeployable towards other uses. As a result, the retailer has no bargaining power ex post.
On the contrary, ex ante, i.e., before the retailer learns about the demand parameter and
before he makes any specific investment towards improving promotional services on this
particular market, the retailer keeps a more equal bargaining power with the manufacturer
and joint-profit maximization becomes quite relevant as an ex ante criterion. Once this
ex ante choice is made, the manufacturer and the retailer can share ex ante joint-profit
through a lump-sum fixed-fee which yields a (non type-dependent) reservation value to
the retailer.43 Second, one should not expect vertical structures which do not maximize
41In particular, it can be seen as a modified version of Bork’s argument if favour of vertical price fixing.
42Actually, this shift in bargaining powers is rather standard in the incomplete contract literature which
assumes that parties have both equal bargaining powers ex post, once some non-verifiable variables be-
come publicly observable, but ex ante organizational choices are made according to an efficiency criterion.
See Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 6) for some remarks on this. The same perspective can be
taken here but in an asymmetric information framework.
43Of course, in a full fledged model, one may want to model explicitly this two-stage bargaining process.
The fact that the first-stage lump-sum transfer do not depend on the retailer’s type by definition would
not invalidate our analysis of the ex post bargaining game since the corresponding reservation payoff of
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ex ante joint-profit to survive in the long-run if we were modelling explicitly entry on both
sides of the market.
In practice, sunk investments on the retailer’s side and free entry both in manufac-
turing and retailing are two easily checkable conditions that may be used in practice by
antitrust authorities to ascertain the optimality of RPM.
6 Partially Verifiable Output
We now briefly extend our analysis to the case where the upstream producer no longer
controls the level of output sold in the market by the retailer. One must now take into
account that the retailer might decide to sell on the downstream market only a fraction
of the quantity bought from the manufacturer. We shall prove that this loss of control
entails no real cost for the manufacturer.
Of course, this extra freedom is only relevant in the case of a RPMmechanism.44 Under
RPM, the manufacturer’s program must now be more carefully stated. In particular, while
the direct, truthful revelation mechanism still specifies a transfer, t(θˆ), a retail price level,
p(θˆ), and a quantity sold to the retailer, q(θˆ), for each retailer’s message θˆ, one must also
take into account that the retailer might decide to sell only a fraction of this quantity
on the downstream market. Formally, this amounts to consider an additional constraint
q ≤ q(θˆ) to the producer’s and the retailer’s programs, where q is now the output actually
sold by the retailer on the final market.
Let us then proceed backward by considering the retailer’s utility level after the allo-
cation (t(θˆ), q(θˆ), p(θˆ)) has been offered given the message θˆ ∈ Θ. It is defined as:
u(θ, θˆ) = max
q≤q(θˆ)
{
p(θˆ)q − ψ(p(θˆ) + q − θ)− t(θˆ)
}
From the concavity of this objective function with respect to q, the quantity qS(θ)
that the retailer sells on the downstream market when truthfully reporting his type to his
manufacturer is thus q(θ) whenever:
p(θ) > ψ′(p(θ) + q(θ)− θ) = ψ′(e(θ)).
Now consider the optimal mechanism (tR(θˆ), qR(θˆ), pR(θˆ)) that is offered when the
the retailer would be fixed. Beyond this rather stark difference between the allocations of ex ante and
ex post bargaining powers, the lessons of our model would carry over to more symmetric distributions of
bargaining power.
44It can be readily seen that the manufacturer can choose to sell to the retailer a quantity so that the
latter does not want to put less on the final downstream market.
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downstream output is contractible. From (5), we have:
pR(θ) > ψ′(pR(θ) + qR(θ)− θ) = ψ′(eR(θ)).
Thus, the retailer has no incentives to sell less on the downstream market than what he
buys from his principal. Therefore, (tR(θˆ), qR(θˆ), pR(θˆ)) remains an optimal mechanism
when the final output is no longer fully verifiable.
The intuition is straightforward. We have already seen that, for screening purposes,
the optimal RPM mechanism reduces the quantity below what would be optimal under
complete information. Now, consider the output choice of the retailer when this output is
non-verifiable. Since the retailer’s objectives are similar to those of the vertical structure
under complete information, the retailer would like to expand output up to the point
where the marginal benefit of one extra unit, i.e., the retail price, is equal to the marginal
disutility of effort. Clearly, the retailer would like to expand output above qR(θ) and he
has no incentives to sell less on the downstream market.
This shows that our results are robust to the lack of verifiability of the final quantity
sold by the retailer.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the private and the welfare properties of vertical contracts based on
retail price restrictions in a successive monopolies framework under both adverse selection
and moral hazard. The analysis reveals two main insights.
First, RPM, although offering a complete set of screening instruments to manufacturers
and increasing thereby their profit, might be detrimental to consumers since it distorts
too much productive efficiency with respect to QF. In this case, we have proved that the
contrasted conclusions of respectively the Chicago School advocating for the legitimacy
of retail price restrictions, and some more recent theoretical contributions, criticizing the
Chicago posture, might both emerge as special cases. Second, when it is preferred by the
vertical structure as a whole, RPM also maximizes consumers’ surplus and total welfare.
From an antitrust policy perspective, assessing whether RPM should be allowed or not
might require knowledge of fine details of the retailers’ technology for providing services
or much confidence on the fact that long run market structure emerges to maximize the
ex ante joint-profit of the manufacturer/retailer coalition. To some extent, these results
can be viewed as confirming the Chicago School conjecture in a setting where information
asymmetries force upstream firms to use more complex instruments than linear prices.
Some extensions of our analysis would deserve further attention. First, one could
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generalize our results to other functional forms. A key simplifying feature of our modelling
was the fact that some sort of dichotomy holds under RPM. Finding out general arguments
on the dominance or not of RPM may not be as clear as soon as such dichotomy no longer
holds. Second, the choice of a contracting mode may have some strategic value in the
context of competing hierarchies and these issues would be worth investigating. Finally,
we have focused on moral hazard at the retailers’ level but it would be worth to introduce
moral hazard at the level of the manufacturers to have a more complete view of the agency
problems introduced by the different vertical restraints. We hope to investigate some of
these issues in future research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Sufficient Conditions for Optimality under RPM
The next lemma shows two technical results. First, it proves that under Assumptions
A1-A4, conditions (5)-(6) are necessary and sufficient for a global maximum. Second, it
verifies that the solution to program (4) also solves PR.
Lemma 8 Assume A1-A4, the following properties hold: (i) the first-order necessary
conditions (5)-(6) are also sufficient for a global optimum; (ii) the solution to program
(4) also optimizes PR.
(i) For any given θ, letH(θ) define the Hessian matrix of the second-order conditions
associated to the maximization program (4), with:
H(θ) =
( − (ψ′′ (e) + h(θ)ψ′′′ (e)) 1− (ψ′′ (e) + h(θ)ψ′′′ (e))
1− (ψ′′ (e) + h(θ)ψ′′′ (e)) − (ψ′′ (e) + h(θ)ψ′′′ (e)) .
)
The second-order sufficient conditions for a global maximum requires H(θ) being strictly
negative defined. Let det[H(θ)] denote the determinant of H(θ). We have det[H(θ)] =
2 (ψ′′(e) + h(θ)ψ′′′(e))− 1 > 0, when A4 holds.
(ii) Since the optimality conditions (5)-(6) require pR(θ) = qR(θ) for all θ, in order to
prove the claim it suffices to verify that: (1) the schedule qR(θ) satisfies constraint IC2 for
all θ; and (2) the global incentive compatibility constraint holds at the optimal allocation{
pR(θˆ), qR(θˆ), tR(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
for all pairs (θ, θˆ) with θ 6= θˆ.
First note that by using (6) and (7) a simple application of the Implicit Function
Theorem yields:
q˙R(θ) =
ψ′′(eR(θ))− ψ′′(eR(θ))h˙(θ) + h(θ)ψ′′′(eR(θ))
2 (ψ′′(eR(θ)) + h(θ)ψ′′′(eR(θ)))− 1 > 0
under Assumptions A1-A4 which proves immediately the claim.
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Then recall that in the optimum pR(θ) = qR(θ) and eR(θ) = 2qR(θ)− θ for all θ. Let
uR(θ, θˆ) define the retailer’s profits evaluated at the optimal allocation
{
pR(θˆ), qR(θˆ), tR(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
when the true retailer’s type is θ and the message sent to the manufacturer is θˆ, with
θˆ 6= θ. Define Γ(θ, θˆ) ≡ uR (θ, θ)− uR(θ, θˆ), and without loss of generality assume θ > θˆ.
Simple algebraic manipulations allow to rewrite Γ(.) as:
Γ(θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
{
2qR(s)q˙R(s)− t˙R(s)− 2ψ′(eR(θ, s))q˙R(s)} ds
By using IC1 and substituting for t˙
R(s) = p˙R(s)qR(s)+ pR(s)q˙R(s)−ψ′(eR(s, s))(p˙R(s)+
q˙R(s)) into the above equation, one obtains Γ(θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
2q˙R(s)
{∫ θ
s
ψ′′(eR(x, s))dx
}
ds.
Since Assumption A2 implies that ψ′′(.) > 0 for all e ≥ 0, it follows that Γ(θ, θˆ) > 0
which immediately proves the claim.
8.2 Proof of Corollary 2
As the direct, deterministic revelation mechanism ωe ≡ {e(θ), p(θ), w(θ)}θ∈Θ replicates
the optimal allocation derived under RPM, in order to prove the result one may restrict
attention to this contract without loss of generality. The claim is proven in two steps.
First, in step 1, we show that the optimal allocation under RPM is implemented by
the indirect nonlinear increasing and convex schedule TR (q) together with the auxiliary
constraint defined by the retail price target p = q. Then, in step 2, we prove that the
contract
{
TR (q) , p = q
}
is implemented by a properly defined menu of its linear tangents.
Proof of step 1. As qR(θ) is increasing in θ, let θR (q) define its inverse. Assume that
the upstream manufacturer offers the indirect mechanism
{
TR (q) ≡ wR(θR (q)), p = q}
to the retailer. Under this contract the downstream firm receives a fixed monetary transfer
TR (q) for any given selected input level q. Differentiating TR (q) with respect to q one
gets T˙R (q) ≡ w˙R(θR (q))/q˙R (θ). Moreover, since qR (θ) = pR (θ) for all θ, by definition of
information rents, one can show that:
wR (θ)− ψ (eR (θ)) = θ∫
θ
ψ′(eR (s))ds
where optimality requires eR (θ) = 2qR (θ)−θ for all θ. Differentiating the above equation
with respect to θ, simple algebra immediately implies that T˙R (q) = 2ψ′(eR(θ)) ≥ 0
for all q, which is precisely the first-order condition of the retailer’s problem when he
chooses the input level within the schedule TR (q). Hence it is straightforward to prove
that the indirect mechanism
{
TR (q) , p = q
}
implements the allocation
{
pR(θ), qR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ.
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Moreover, differentiating again with respect to q one gets
T¨R (q)
2ψ′′(eR(θ))
=
(2ψ′′(eR(θ))|h˙(θ)|+ 1)
ψ′′(eR(θ)) + ψ′′(eR(θ))|h˙(θ)|+ ψ′′′(eR(θ))h(θ)
Finally, by using assumptionA4 and ψ′′(e) > 0 for all e ≥ 0, one can show that T¨R (q) ≥ 0
for all q since both the denominator and the numerator in the above equation are positive.
Proof of step 2. Consider the menu of linear contracts T (q, q0) tangent to T
R (q),
i.e., such that T (q, q0) = T
R (q0) + T˙
R (q0) (q − q0). And, assume that the upstream
manufacturer proposes a linear contract {T (., q0) , p = q}. The retailer chooses which
tangent is its most preferred one (q0) and the level of input (q). Moreover, the contract
also requires the additional constraint dictating a price target such that, for any given q,
the retail price45 must satisfy p = q. The optimal pair (qR0 , q
R) must then be the unique
solution to the following optimization program
max
〈q,q0〉
T (q, q0)− ψ(2q − θ) (15)
The first-order necessary conditions are given then by
T˙R
(
qR0
)− 2ψ′(2qR − θ) = 0
−T¨R (qR0 ) (qR − qR0 ) = 0
Since TR (q) is a convex function it follows that qR = qR0 = q
R (θ) for all θ. Which proves
the claim provided that qR (θ) is a global optimum of (15). To check sufficiency one needs
simply to verify that the corresponding Hessian HR(θ) of the second-order derivatives
must be strictly definite negative at qR (θ) for all θ.
HR(θ) =
( −4ψ′′ (eR(θ)) T¨R (qR (θ))
T¨R
(
qR (θ)
) −T¨R (qR (θ))
)
As ψ′′ (e) > 0 for all e ≥ 0 by A2, TR (qR (θ)) is convex and qR(θ) is increasing, the claim
follows immediately since det[HR(θ)] = T¨R (qR (θ))ψ′′ (eR(θ)) (2+ 1/q˙R(θ)) ≥ 0 for all θ.
8.3 Sufficient Conditions for Optimality under QF
The next lemma proves formally that solving the auxiliary program (9) is equivalent to
solving PQ.
45This mechanism clearly implements the optimal level of effort e = 2q − θ.
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Lemma 9 Assume A1-A3, the following properties hold: (i) the first-order necessary
condition (10) is also sufficient for a global optimum;(ii) the solution to program (9) also
optimizes PQ.
(i) The proof follows immediately since ψ′′(e) > 1/2 for all e by A2.
(ii) In order to prove the claim it suffices to verify that: (1) the optimal quantity
schedule qQ(θ) satisfies IC2 for all θ; and (2) the global incentive compatibility constraint
holds at the optimal allocation
{
eQ(θ), qQ(θ), tQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ.
First, observe that, by equation (10), a simple application of the Implicit Function
Theorem allows to obtain q˙Q(θ) = (1 − h˙(θ))/(2 − φ′ (qQ)). Since assumptions A1 and
A3 imply respectively h˙(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ and 2 − φ′(.) > 0 for all q, the proof follows
immediately.
Next, define by uQ(θ, θˆ) the retailer’s utility function evaluated at the optimal allo-
cation
{
eQ(θˆ), qQ(θˆ), tQ(θˆ)
}
θˆ∈Θ
, whenever the true type is θ and the message sent to the
manufacturer is θˆ, with θˆ 6= θ. Let Γ(θ, θˆ) ≡ uQ (θ, θ) − uQ(θ, θˆ), and without loss of
generality assume that θ > θˆ. Simple algebraic manipulations allow to rewrite Γ(θ, θˆ) as:
Γ(θ, θˆ) =
θ∫
θˆ
{
θ q˙Q(x) + q˙Q(x)φ
(
qQ(x)
)− 2 q˙Q(x)qQ(x)− t˙Q(x)} dx
by using IC1 and substituting for t˙
Q(x) = q˙Q(x)(x + φ
(
qQ(x)
) − 2qQ(x)) in the above
equation, one immediately obtains that Γ(θ, θˆ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
(q˙Q (x) (
∫ θ
u
(s2/2) ds)dx, which is
positive and so proves the claim.
8.4 Proof of Corollary 3
The proof is organized in two steps. In step 1, we show that the nonlinear indirect
mechanism TQ (q) ≡ tQ (θQ (q)) implements the optimal direct revelation mechanism
allocation
{
eQ(θ), qQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ. Then, in step 2, we prove that T
Q (q) is implemented by a
properly chosen menu of its linear tangents.
Proof of step 1. Once again, to reconstruct the indirect mechanism TQ(q) from the
direct revelation mechanism
{
tQ(θ), qQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ is quite easy. Let θ
Q (q) define the inverse
of qQ(θ). Consider the indirect mechanism TQ (q) ≡ tQ (θQ (q)), by definition it follows
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that T˙Q (q) ≡ t˙Q (θQ (q)) /q˙Q (θ); moreover, by construction, equation (8) implies:
(
θ + φ
(
qQ (θ)
)− qQ (θ)) qQ (θ)−ψ (φ (qQ (θ)))−tQ (θ) = θ∫
θ
qQ(s)ds
Differentiating the above equation with respect to θ and using an envelope argument, one
immediately gets:
t˙Q (θ) =
(
θ + φ
(
qQ (θ)
)− 2qQ (θ)) q˙Q (θ) , ∀ θ ∈ Θ
By using (10), the above condition implies T˙Q (q) = h(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, which is precisely
the first-order condition of the retailer’s problem when he chooses the input level within
the schedule TQ(q). Hence it is straightforward to verify that the nonlinear schedule
TQ (q) ≡ tQ (θQ (q)) implements the optimal allocation {eQ(θ), qQ(θ)}
θ∈Θ. Differentiating
T˙Q (q) again, it follows that T¨Q (q) = −|h˙(θ)|/q˙Q(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ, hence TQ(.) is concave.
Proof of step 2. We now show that there exists a menu of linear contracts T (q, q0) im-
plementing the optimal direct revelation mechanism allocation
{
tQ(θ), qQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ. Assume
that the upstream manufacturer offers to the downstream retailer a menu of linear con-
tracts T (q, q0) tangent to the non-linear schedule T
Q(q). Define this menu by T (q, q0) =
TQ (q0) + T˙
Q (q0) (q − q0), the retailer will then choose both a tangent q0 and the level of
input q such that:
(qQ, qQ0 ) ∈ argmax
〈q,q0〉
{(θ + φ (q)− q) q − ψ (φ (q))− T (q, q0)} . (16)
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to q0 and q are respectively:
−T¨Q(qQ0 )(qQ0 − qQ) = 0,
θ + φ
(
qQ
)− 2qQ − T˙Q(qQ0 ) = 0.
Since TQ (.) is concave, one may immediately verify that qQ = qQ0 . It then follows imme-
diately that (θ + φ(qQ0 ) − 2qQ0 )q˙Q0 − t˙Q (θ) = 0 for all θ. Hence, if the above first-order
conditions are also sufficient for an optimum, retailers of type θ choose qQ = qQ0 = q
Q (θ)
for all θ. Which proves the claim provided that qQ (θ) is a global optimum of program
(16). In order to check sufficiency one needs simply to verify that the corresponding Hes-
sian HQ(θ) of second-order derivatives must be strictly definite-negative at qQ(θ) for all
θ:
HQ(θ) =
(
(φ′
(
qQ (θ)
)− 2) −T¨Q (qQ (θ))
−T¨Q (qQ (θ)) T¨Q (qQ (θ))
)
.
Since we have shown above that TQ (q) is concave, and assumption A2 implies that
φ′
(
qQ (θ)
)−2 < 0, the result follows immediately as det[HQ(θ)] = −T¨Q (qQ (θ)) /q˙Q (θ) ≥
0 for all θ.
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Combining the optimality conditions obtained under QF, and expressing everything
in terms of effort yields that eQ(θ) solves:
2ψ′(e)− e = θ − h(θ), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (17)
Doing the same under RPM, eR(θ) solves:
2ψ′(e)− e = θ − 2h(θ)ψ′′(e), ∀ θ ∈ Θ. (18)
From A2, the right-hand side of (17) is greater than that of (18) and thus eQ(θ) ≥ eR(θ)
with equality only at θ = θ.
(ii) Combining the optimality conditions obtained under QF, and expressing every-
thing in terms of output yields that qQ(θ) solves:
q = ψ′(2q − θ + h(θ)),∀ θ ∈ Θ. (19)
Doing the same under RPM, qR(θ) solves:
q = ψ′(2q − θ + h(θ)) + h(θ)ψ′′(2q − θ + h(θ)),∀ θ ∈ Θ. (20)
Note then that, for any h, we have:
ψ′(x+ h) > ψ′(x) + hψ′′(x) when ψ′′′(·) > 0
and
ψ′(x+ h) < ψ′(x) + hψ′′(x) when ψ′′′(·) < 0.
When ψ′′′(·) > 0, the right-hand side of (19) is greater than that of (20) and thus
qR(θ) ≥ qQ(θ) with equality only at θ = θ. This is the reverse when ψ′′′(·) < 0.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Given a generic θ ∈ Θ and ω ∈M, define the net consumers surplus by:
CSω(θ) ≡
qω(θ)∫
0
P (x, eω(θ), θ) dx− P (qω (θ) , eω (θ) , θ)qω (θ) = (qω (θ))2/2
Straightforward algebraic manipulations yield Eθ[∆CS (θ)] = Eθ[(q
R(θ)− qQ(θ))(qR(θ)+
qQ(θ))]/2. Since qR(θ) ≥ qQ(θ) (resp. ≤ 0) for all θ if ψ′′′(.) ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0) for all e, the
claim then follows immediately.
(ii) The proof of this claim is based on a straightforward revealed preferences argu-
ment, so it will be omitted.
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8.7 Proof of Proposition 6
First note that,
∆Π(θ) = (θ + eR(θ)− qR(θ))qR(θ)− (θ + eQ(θ)− qQ(θ))qQ(θ) + ψ(eQ(θ))− ψ(eR(θ))
can be rewritten using the definitions of
{
qR(θ), eR(θ)
}
θ∈Θ and
{
qQ(θ), eQ(θ)
}
θ∈Θ as:
∆Π(θ) = (qR(θ))2 − (qQ(θ))2 − h(θ)qQ(θ) + ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ + h(θ))− ψ(2qR(θ)− θ)
where qQ(θ) = ψ′(2qQ(θ)− θ + h(θ)).
First, using convexity of ψ(.), we get:
ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ + h(θ))− h(θ)ψ′(2qQ(θ)− θ + h(θ)) ≤ ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ)
Therefore,
∆Π(θ) ≤ (qR(θ))2 − (qQ(θ))2 − ψ(2qR(θ)− θ) + ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ) (21)
Now, notice that the function Ψ(x) = x2 − ψ(2x − θ) is maximized at the first best
output q∗(θ) and is concave by assumption.
The steps below conclude the proof.
Step 1. To begin with, consider the case ψ′′′(.) ≤ 0 so that qR(θ) ≤ qQ(θ) ≤ q∗(θ) for
all θ. Then from equation (21) we get:
∆Π(θ) ≤ (qR(θ))2 − (qQ(θ))2 − ψ(2qR(θ)− θ) + ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ) ≤ 0 ∀ θ ∈ Θ
where the last equality follows from the concavity of Ψ(.). Taking expectations yields
Eθ[∆Π (θ)] ≤ 0.
Step 2. Consider now ψ′′′(.) > 0 so that qQ(θ) < qR(θ) < q∗(θ) for all θ < θ¯. Then,
define g(y) = ψ(x+y)−yψ′(x)−ψ(x). One can check that g′′′(y) = ψ′′′(x+y). Therefore,
g(y) ≥ g(0) + yg′(0) + y
2
2
g′′(0) =
y2
2
g′′(0)
Taking x = 2qQ(θ)− θ and y = h(θ), we get the following inequality:
ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ + h(θ))− h(θ)ψ′(2qQ(θ)− θ)− ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ) ≥ h(θ)
2
2
ψ′′(2qQ(θ)− θ) (22)
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Inserting (22) into ∆Π(θ) yields:
∆Π(θ) ≥ {qR(θ)2 − ψ(2qR(θ)− θ)− (qQ(θ)2 − ψ(2qQ(θ)− θ))}+ h(θ)2
2
ψ′′(2qQ(θ)− θ)
(23)
The second term in (23) is positive, the first one is also positive when q∗(θ) > qR(θ) >
qQ(θ) for all θ < θ¯ since Ψ(.) is concave. Taking expectations yields Eθ[∆Π (θ)] ≥ 0.
Finally, gathering steps 1 and 2 establishes the proof.
8.8 Proof of Corollary 7
By Proposition 6, a necessary condition for RPM to maximize constrained joint-profits is
ψ′′′(e) > 0 for all e. Since by Proposition 4 ψ′′′(e) > 0 for all e implies qR(θ) ≥ qQ(θ) for
all θ with equality at θ¯, the claim follows immediately by part (i) of Proposition 5.
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